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LOCKHART v. COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION SYSTEMS
439 S.E.2d 328 (1994)
Virginia Supreme Court
FACTS
In two separate cases, employees alleged they
had been fired because of their race and sex, respec-
tively. Lawanda Lockhart, a black woman, was the
director of admissions at Commonwealth College
(Commonwealth). Lockhart alleged that she was
first demoted, then fired on account of her refusal
to participate in the discriminatory practices and po-
lices of the institution.
Specifically, Lockhart claimed that the college
had engaged in discriminatory policies and practices
against African-Americans in admission and employ-
ment. She claimed that the president of
Commonwealth's Richmond campus (where she
worked) had attempted to force her to fire, solely
on the basis of race, black employees who failed to
meet production goals while retaining white em-
ployees who had failed to meet those same goals.
Lockhart further alleged that on at least two occa-
sions she witnessed derogatory remarks being made
about African-Americans by high-level officials of
Commonwealth, in particular the College's regis-
trar who made racially offensive remarks while meet-
ing with prospective students.
Lockhart refused to participate in these poli-
cies and reported the violations to her superiors. In
response, the College officials demoted her. After
Lockhart contacted the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and a
private attorney, who in turn contacted representa-
tives of Commonwealth, she was given an unsatis-
factory performance evaluation and discharged "amid
claims her performance was inadequate even though
white co-workers, with markedly less productivity,
were retained."'
Lockhart sued in state court, and the trial court
sustained Commonwealth's demurrer on the ground
that Virginia does not recognize a cause of action
for wrongful discharge of employment.2 The Virginia
I Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Systems Corp., 439
S.E.2d 328,329 (1994).
2Virginia Human Rights Act, 2.1-725 (1950) reads:
"Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed
to create, an independent or private cause of action to
enforce its provisions. Nor shall the policies or provisions
of this chapter be construed to allow tort actions to be
Court ofAppeals affirmed and theVirginia Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
In the second case, Nancy L.Wright approached
Wayne B. Donelly, president of Donelly and Com-
pany, in June, 1991, concerning a possible position
with his company. She was hired as an administra-
tive assistant by Donelly in July of 1991, and began
work on July 22 of that year. On Wright's first day
of work, Wright alleged that Donelly approached
her from behind and kissed her cheek. Wright
claimed that on the following day Donelly "physi-
cally seized her, grabbed her and hugged her with-
out her consent.'0 Wright then informed Donelly
that she did not intend to be subjected to this treat-
ment and that she could not work under these con-
ditions. Donelly told Wright that they would "work
things out."4 On July 24, 1991, Donelly made "re-
peated abusive, inappropriate, and harassing re-
marks" to her and then ordered her from the estab-
lishment.5
Wright sued, alleging that her discharge was
unlawful because it violated the public policy of
Virginia as articulated in the Virginia Human Rights
Act Code 2.1-714 through 2.1-725. The trial court
sustained a demurrer filed by Donelly on the basis
that no cause of action for wrongful discharge was
recognized for gender discrimination. The Virginia
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and on
appeal the Virginia Supreme Court consolidated this
case with the Lockhart case.
HOLDING
In a six to three decision, the Virginia Su-
preme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. Jus-
tice Hassell, writing for the majority, held that
the narrow public policy exception to the "em-
ployment-at-will" doctrine of Bowman v. State
Bank of Keysville6 should be expanded to include
discharge for race and gender.7 The Court, how-
instituted instead of or in addition to the current statu-
tory actions for unlawful discrimination."
3 Lockhart, 439 S.E. 2d at 329.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 330.
6 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
1 Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
ever, explicitly denied reliance upon the Virginia
Human Rights Act to create a new cause of ac-
tion.$
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Virginia's
commitment to the "employment-at-will" doctrine.:
This rule, however, is subject to narrow policy ex-
ceptions.
In Bowman, the defendant bank argued that
plaintiffs Bowman and Bridges were at-will employ-
ees. As such, the Bank had the right to terminate
them at any time for any reason. The Court found
an exception to the rule, holding that the retalia-
tory discharge of stockholder-employees who op-
posed the violation of security regulations by their
employers was a violation of public policy. '
In Miller v. SEVAMP," the plaintiff employee
argued that she was discharged in retaliation for the
plaintiff's appearance in a fellow employee's griev-
ance hearing and relied upon SEVAMP's Personnel
and Administrative Procedures Manual as provid-
ing her with protection from at-will termination.
While the Court recognized an exception to the at-
will employment doctrine where a discharge vio-
lates public "policy ... designed to protect property
rights, personal freedoms, health safety or welfare
of the people,"2 the Court found that the excep-
tion in Bowman did not include private rights.
Building upon Bowman and SEVAMP, the
Lockhart Court stated that the personal freedom to
pursue employment free of race or gender discrimi-
nation was of far greater importance than the free-
dom of a stockholder to exercise the right to vote
stock free of duress and intimidation.' ' "The Gen-
s Id. at 331.
q Id. at 330. Virginia adheres to the common law
rule that when the intended duration of a contract for the
rendition of services cannot be determined by fair infer-
ence from the terms of the contract, then either party is
ordinarily at liberty to terminate the contract at will. Id.
"' Bowman, 331 S.E.2d at 800. Code 13.1-32, now
Code 13.1-662, confers on each shareholder one vote.
This stautory provision contemplates that the right to vote
shall be exercised free of duress and intimidation imposed
on individual stockholders by corporate management. Be-
cause the right conferred by statute is in furtherance of
an established public policy, the employer may not law-
fully use the threat of discharge of an at-will employee as
a device to control the otherwise unfettered discretion of
the shareholder to vote freely his or her stock in the cor-
poration. Id. at 801.
11 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).
eral Assembly," the Court added, "has declared this
Commonwealth's strong public policy against em-
ployment discrimination based upon race or gen-
der." 4 The Court cited the Virginia Human Rights
Act in support of this proposition,' s but denied cre-
ating a new cause of action based upon the Act. In-
stead, the Court declared that it was relying "solely"
upon the narrow exception of Bowman. "
The Court rejected Commonwealth's argument
that Lockhart had no claim under the Bowman ex-
ception because there were federal remedies avail-
able to her. "It is not uncommon," the Court noted,
"that injuries resulting from one set of operative facts
may give rise to several remedies, including com-
mon law tort remedies as well as federal statutory
remedies."' 7 Further, the Court denied that Lockhart
was required to exhaust administrative remedies
under Title VII before filing a state tort action."'
Justices Compton, Carrico, and Stephenson dis-
sented, urging that under 2.1-725 of the Virginia
Human Rights Act no new causes of action may be
created."' Despite the majority's disclaimer to the
contrary, the dissent stated that the majority had
"obviously" created a cause of action to enforce pro-
visions of the Virginia Human Rights Act. " The cre-
ation of this new cause of action resulted in an un-
warranted encroachment upon the employment-at-
will doctrine, "rigidly adhered to by this Court until
now."
2'
After Lockhart, an employee may sustain a cause
of action for improper discharge based upon either
racial or gender discrimination. The employee must
show that the termination was against the public
policy of Virginia, although the Court does hint that
public policy based on a federal statute could be the
basis for such an action.22 The Court has not, how-
"- Bowman, 331 S.E.2d 797, (1985).
" Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
14 Id.
' Virginia Human Rights Act, Code 2.1-715. (It is
the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia: 1. To safe-
guard all individuals within the Commonwealth from
unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age, marital status or disability, in
places of public accommodation, including educational
institutions and in real estate transactions; in employment
'" Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
' Id.
I d. at 332.
"' See supra note 1.
2 1 Id. at 332.
21 Id.
2- Id.
ever, specified what evidence at trial will provide a
plaintiff with a prima facie case since this decision
was rendered on a demurrer.
Lockhart appears to be a major departure from
the framework created in Bowman and SEVAMP. In
the previous cases, the Court acted in a conserva-
tive manner, protecting the rights of all individuals
by focusing upon some statute or public law that
protected some broad ideal and, alternatively, re-
quiring that a public right be vindicated. In Lockhart,
however, the Court has acted without any statutory
mandate at all. As will be shown, the Court appears
to have created a common law cause of action for
wrongful discharge based upon a broad "public
policy" claim,25 which is an uncharacteristic step for
a court as conservative as the Virginia Supreme
Court to take.
Although the Court emphasizes that the excep-
tions to Virginia's employment-at-will doctrine are
narrow, its focus upon "public policy" as an excep-
tion has the potential to become a major breach in
the at-will employment doctrine. The Court defines
public policy as "the policy underlying laws designed
to protect the property rights, personal freedoms,
health, safety, or welfare of the people in general."z4
In Bowman and SEVAMP, the Court tied the excep-
tion to the at-will employment doctrine to a spe-
cific statute.25 In Lockhart, however, because the
Court has defined public policy as a policy underly-
ing a diverse group of laws, it has operationalized a
"narrow" exception in a very expansive fashion and
created a common law right of action. Presumably
then, an employee who is discharged in violation of
the policy underlying public safety laws or property
statutes would have a cause of action under this
exception. Further, laws which protect "the welfare
of the people in general" may be stretched by an
expansive court to include nearly every law in Vir-
ginia. A plaintiff could possibly utilize any law that
arguably protects "the welfare of the people in gen-
eral" and survive a motion to dismiss.
The Court seems to have taken a contradictory
course in carving out exceptions to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine. In SEVAMP, the Court stated,
'We. ... think it wise to leave to the deliberate pro-
2 See Frank C. Morris, Jr., "Litigation Challenges to
Layoffs and Corporate Downsizing," American Law In-
stitute, April 28, 1994.
24 Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting Mill v.
SEVAMP, 362 S.E.2d at 918.).
SIn Bowman the Court relied on Code 13.1-32 [now
Code 13.1-662]. Bowman, 331 S.E.2d at 800. In SEVAMP,
cesses of the General Assembly any substantial al-
teration of the doctrine."26 The Court followed its
reasoning in Bowman that required the plaintiff to
find some statute that represented the public policy
the defendant employer had violated.27 In Lockhart,
however, the Court has embraced an exception to
the at-will employment doctrine without utilizing
any statute promulgated by the General Assembly.
By doing so, the Court has created a situation in
which judges and not the Legislature will define the
contours of this "public policy" exception.
If the Court did not intend to define "public
policy" in such a broad manner, then the dissent has
correctly asserted that the majority has created a
cause of action against the express will of the Legis-
lature-28 Although the Court attempts to place the
cause of action under the broad rubric of "public
policy," the opinion relies heavily upon the language
of the Virginia Human Rights Act in reaching its
conclusion, implicitly identifying the public policy
ideals mentioned in that statute as those relevant to
the case. The Court states that Ms. Wright pleaded
a viable cause of action despite the fact that she cited
Code 2.1-725.29 Therefore, if the Court has intended
to limit public policy to policy established by exist-
ing law, then it has simply read out the plain lan-
guage of 2.1-725 of the Act in order to carve this
exception.
If the Lockhart exception proves to be very
broad, it will create practical problems for employ-
ers. Lockhart will force employers to dearly state
their reasons for terminating employees. Although
forcing an employer to dearly articulate the reasons.
that an employee is terminated could be beneficial
in the short run, employers may fall into a pattern
of utilizing "safe" excuses so that the benefit of dis-
closure is forfeited in the long run.
Lockhart could also present evidentiary prob-
lems for employers. In order to be completely insu-
lated from an attack by the employee for wrongful
discharge based upon this public policy exception,
the employer may be forced to document evidence
of its compliance with the public policies underly-
ing the broad range of topics the Court listed. The
primary manner in which employers will achieve
the Court found that the plaintiff's failure to argue a vio-
lation of "public policy established by existing laws for
the protection of the public generally" did not fall within
the Bowman exception. SEVAMP, 362 S.E.2d at 919.
26 SEVAMP, 362 S.E.2d at 919.
2 See supra, note 24.
2' See supra, note 2.
29 See supra, note 2.
compliance will be by providing evidence of the
employee's inadequacy?0 For businesses that con-
duct evaluations of its employees on a regular basis,
documentation will not present any obstacle. How-
ever, for very small, businesses with no formal evalu-
ation process, Lockhart may impose an additional
responsibility and expense. Otherwise, the business
will be open to a suit for wrongfl discharge.
The Court has not stated why it included the
long review of the fact patterns of the two cases.
On first blush it seems that the Court was furnish-
ing practitioners with a "blueprint" of facts to al-
lege. However, after recounting the facts in great
detail in the early portion of the opinion, the Court
makes no mention of them in reaching its decision.
The Court assumes that facts as alleged are suffi-
cient, but does not state which facts are crucial to a
plaintiff in stating a cause of action under the ex-
ception. Instead, the Court focuses upon the Vir-
ginia Human Rights Act as proof of the Legislature's
intent and says no more. Therefore, it may be that
the Court included the facts simply because of their
egregious nature. Outrageous facts such as those in
Lockhart tend to justify and hide the expansive lan-
guage of the decision, not to mention the fact that
-" This detailed documentation may actually hurt em-
ployees in the long run by damaging their chances of find-
ing other employment by highlighting their deficiencies.
they tend to draw attention away from the fact that
the Court has created a cause of action under the
Virginia Human Rights Act, rather than to offer
plaintiffs a "blueprint."
CONCLUSION
Practitioners will want to watch the Court's fu-
ture opinions on this issue closely. Although the
court probably saw the creation of a common law
right of action for wrongful discharge as being in
the best interests of the Commonwealth, a court as
traditionally conservative as the Virginia Supreme
Court may rethink some of the broad language found
in the Lockhart opinion. Moreover, at this time, the
Court has done nothing more than to allow the case
to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court has not
specified how the case will be presented at trial or
what facts are critical to a plaintiff's success. The
Court may limit the scope of the public policy ex-
ception to so-called "suspect classes" such as gender,
race, religion or national origin. The Court may also
refine its holding in Lockhart to require that plain-
tiff cite a particular statute in pleading a viable cause
of action. As the Court has defined "public policy"
at this time, though, the exception has the poten-
tial to become extremely broad.
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